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ABSTRACT: In Epistemological Disjunctivism, Duncan Prichard defends his brand of 
epistemological disjunctivism from three worries. In this paper I argue that his responses 
to two of these worries are in tension with one another. 
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In his wide-ranging and ambitious Epistemological Disjunctivism, Duncan 
Pritchard outlines and defends what he calls the “holy grail” of epistemology – a 
view that aims to combine the virtues of both internalist and externalist 
approaches in epistemology, and which claims to offer a novel, robust, and 
“satisfying” response to the problem of radical skepticism. The only problem with 
this view, Pritchard notes, is that it “occupies a region of logical space in 
epistemology that many hold is simply unavailable.”1 According to Pritchard’s 
diagnosis, there are three chief prima facie problems for his brand of 
epistemological disjunctivism that have seemed to make it unavailable, and his 
defense is constituted by replies to these three problems, in addition to an 
elaboration of its virtues. But unfortunately for the search for epistemology’s holy 
grail, in this paper I will show that Pritchard’s responses to two of the three 
problems facing his preferred form of epistemological disjunctivism are in tension. 
1. The Setup: What Is Epistemological Disjunctivism? 
The view that Prichard calls epistemological disjunctivism, he formulates as 
follows: 
Epistemological Disjunctivism: The Core Thesis 
In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge an agent, S, has perceptual 
knowledge that  in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R, for her 
belief that  which is both factive (i.e., R’s obtaining entails ) and reflectively 
accessible to S.2 
                                                                
1 Duncan Prichard, Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 18. 
2 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 13. After stating this principle using ‘’ as a 
schematic letter for propositions on the first page of his first chapter, Pritchard goes on to never 
use ‘’ again, instead using ‘p.’ I’ll follow him in this. 
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What Pritchard means by this is best illustrated by considering a specific 
case of perceptual knowledge, such as that in which you know that this paper is in 
front of you. In the paradigmatic case, you start by seeing that this paper is in 
front of you, and at least partially in virtue of that fact, the fact that you see that 
this paper is in front of you is reflectively accessible to you – meaning that you can 
know it by reflection alone. Call this fact R.  
So in virtue of being in a position to know that you see that this paper is in 
front of you, you possess R as rational support – as your reason for your perceptual 
knowledge that this paper is in front of you. And it is a particularly excellent 
reason, because it actually entails that this paper is in front of you (since you 
cannot count as seeing that this is true unless it really is true). So in paradigmatic 
cases of perceptual knowledge, your knowledge is supported by reasons of the 
very best sort, and these reasons are not merely some external facts about 
reliability or safety that are epistemically inaccessible to you and hence 
unavailable in responding to radical skepticism, but rather they are your very own 
reasons – accessible to you on the basis of reflection alone. Hence, Prichard’s view 
has much in common with classical forms of internalist foundationalism such as 
those of C.I. Lewis and Roderick Chisholm, on which the basic perceptual reasons 
are facts about your subjective psychological experience that are presumed to be 
luminous, incorrigible, or otherwise knowable on the basis of reflection alone, 
except that Pritchard’s view claims that in paradigmatic cases, what happens is 
that there is a world-implicating fact – that you factively see that p – that is 
knowable by reflection alone. And this gives Pritchard’s view a whole set of 
advantages that are unavailable to classical forms of internalism. 
What makes this view count as a kind of disjunctivist view about perceptual 
knowledge is that as Pritchard interprets the view, the kind of rational support 
that the core thesis describes is not available in cases in which you are faced with 
an illusion or a hallucination. Although this isn’t obvious from the formulation of 
the core thesis by itself, it follows from Pritchard’s interpretation that for a piece 
of rational support to be reflectively available to you, it must be possible for you to 
know it by reflection alone. Since knowledge is factive, knowability by reflection 
alone is presumably factive,3 and so you cannot have this rational support for your 
belief that p unless you see that p. In the philosophy of perception, disjunctivism 
about perceptual experience is the view that seeing that p is a state that is different 
in kind from states that are subjectively indiscriminable from it, such as suffering a 
visual illusion as of p or having a hallucination as of p. So by analogy, the 
                                                                
3 Perhaps some things that are not true can be known by reflection alone, such as that you are 
reflecting, but that you see that  is not among them. 
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consequence of Prichard’s view that the rational support available for perceptual 
beliefs is different in kind in these cases is naturally termed a kind of 
epistemological disjunctivism, and as Prichard notes, though there is no 
entailment between perceptual and epistemological disjunctivism in either 
direction, the two views may be natural allies. 
I’ll note in passing that it is probably not good practice in nomenclature to 
name views by their consequences rather than by their core theses. Pritchard’s 
view earns the name of epistemological disjunctivism because it holds that the 
form of rational support available for perceptual beliefs differs between the good 
and bad cases, but he accepts this thesis for very particular reasons that need not 
be shared by everyone who holds that the form of rational support available in the 
good and bad cases differ. For example, on one sort of view, in virtue of seeing that 
p, you count as having that p available as your reason to believe that p.4 This view 
allows a form of rational support that is only available in the good case, but it does 
not carry Pritchard’s commitment that the fact that you see that p is reflectively 
available. Similarly, on another sort of view, when you see that p, the fact that you 
see that p counts as part of the rational support that you have for p regardless of 
whether it is reflectively accessible to you – just because it is true.5 This view 
again allows a form of rational support that is only available in the good case, but 
again, it does not carry Pritchard’s commitments about reflective availability. So 
the term, ‘epistemological disjunctivism’ is probably better reserved as a name for 
what these different views have in common. Hence I’ll continue in what follows 
to refer to Pritchard’s view and to the core thesis, or to Pritchard’s form of 
epistemological disjunctivism. 
 
                                                                
4 This appears to be Timothy Williamson’s view; he holds that your evidence is what you know 
and that seeing that P entails knowing that P, so in virtue of seeing that P, you come to have P 
as part of your evidence. Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2000). 
5 This is how Matthew McGrath and Juan Comesaña interpret John McDowell’s view, especially 
in John McDowell, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” in Experience, Norm, and Nature, ed. 
John McDowell and J. Lindgaard (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009). See especially Matthew 
McGrath and Juan Comesaña, “Perceptual Reasons,” Philosophical Studies Online First, 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-015-0542-x. In his book, Pritchard 
distinguishes on pages 36-37 between accessibilist and mentalist forms of epistemological 
internalism, and defends the core thesis as satisfying a form of accessibilism. In that context, it is 
natural to interpret the view McGrath and Comesaña attribute to McDowell as the mentalist 
analogue of Pritchard’s core thesis. 
Mark Schroeder 
104 
2. The Basing Problem 
The simplest problem that Pritchard considers for his core thesis is posed by the 
idea that seeing that p entails knowing that p. This idea is, Pritchard suggests, 
accepted by “most views,”6 and it is certainly a consequence of Timothy 
Williamson’s familiar thesis that knowledge is the most general factive stative 
attitude.7 But if seeing entails knowing, then it is hard to see how the fact that you 
see that this paper is in front of you could be your basis for believing that this 
paper is in front of you. 
Prichard’s solution to this problem is to reject – rightly, I believe – the 
principle that seeing entails knowing. His chief counterexample to this entailment 
involves a case in which you have misleading evidence. For example, if you are 
driving through normal countryside but have rationally come to believe that you 
are in fake barn country, then when you look at the barn directly in front of you, 
if you are rational, then you will see that there is a barn, but you will not know 
that there is a barn, because you will not believe that there is a barn. And indeed, 
even if you irrationally do believe that there is a barn, still the fact that this is an 
irrational belief will prevent it from being knowledge. 
I have no issue with this counterexample; I myself have actually offered the 
same sort of case as a counterexample to the thesis that seeing entails knowing. 
And indeed, I believe that there are other sorts of counterexamples. For example, 
your perceptual experience represents far more things than you actually form 
beliefs about. And in the good case, your visual relationship to all of these things 
that are represented is factive – a kind of visual success. So you see them to be the 
case, but since you don’t believe them to be the case, you don’t know them to be 
the case. And similarly, even when you do form beliefs on the basis of your 
perceptual experiences, those beliefs are always formed some time after the 
perceptual experience. So in the intervening time, while you are in the process of 
forming the belief on the basis of what you see, you see that p without believing 
that p, and hence without knowing that p. 
Indeed – and this will be important later – I believe that it is a conceptual 
point that if R is the original basis of one’s belief that p, then one must have been 
in possession of R before forming the belief that p. It is possible, of course, to shift 
                                                                
6 Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism, 21. 
7 Though see John Turri, “Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?” Theoria 76 (2010), 197-206 for a 
dissenting opinion. Turri’s counterexamples to the sees entails knows principle are inconsistent 
with the judgments about seeing in fake barn cases that Pritchard relies on, and I myself prefer 
Pritchard’s reasons for rejecting the principle (see Mark Schroeder, “Knowledge is Not the Most 
General Factive Stative Attitude,” unpublished manuscript). 
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the basis for one’s belief that p – for example, you may start by believing that p for 
the reason that S, and then come to learn that R, which also supports p. If you 
then learn that you were wrong about S, or simply forget S, R may then be the 
basis for your belief that p even if you were not in possession of R before you 
formed the belief that p. But this is possible only because you had some other 
original basis for your belief, which has shifted. The conceptual point is that if R is 
the original basis of your belief that p, then you must have been in possession of R 
before forming the belief that p.  
Pritchard does not explicitly endorse this conceptual principle about basing. 
But in the absence of such a principle, it is hard to see why he should think that it 
needs to be possible to see that p without knowing that p, in order to make sense 
of how it is possible for the fact that one sees that p to be one’s basis for one’s 
knowledge that p. The conceptual point about temporal priority of original basing 
explains why the basing problem is even a prima facie problem for Pritchard’s 
thesis, and it explains why rejecting the principle that seeing entails knowing 
would help to address this problem. And it follows from this principle that it is 
possible to see without knowing even in cases in which you have no misleading 
evidence and are in a position to know – but simply don’t know, yet. This turns 
out to be in direct tension with Pritchard’s solution to a second prima facie 
problem for his core thesis. 
3. The Access Problem 
The second serious problem for his core thesis that Pritchard takes up is what he 
calls the access problem. The access problem is a worry to the effect that if it is 
really possible to know by reflection alone that one sees that p, as Pritchard’s core 
thesis claims, then it must be possible to know by reflection alone that p. But p is 
just a paradigmatic ordinary empirical proposition that is directly perceptually 
observable. Such propositions are not knowable on the basis of reflection alone, 
and so that is good reason to think that the core thesis must be false – it can’t be 
possible to know that one sees that p on the basis of reflection alone. 
Pritchard first imagines that this problem is posed for an agent who already 
has empirical knowledge. But he notes that if it is only possible for an agent who 
already has empirical knowledge that p to know that p on the basis of reflection, 
that does not really show that it is possible to know that p on the basis of 
reflection alone. And so in order to constitute a serious objection, the access 
problem must focus on cases in which the agent does not have knowledge that p. 
Pritchard formulates this more formidable version of this objection as follows: 
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The Access Problem 
(AP1'') S can know by reflection alone that she is in possession of the factive 
reason R for believing the specific empirical proposition p (although she does not 
believe that p on this basis, or on any other basis). [Premise] 
(AP2'') S can know by reflection alone that R entails p. [Premise] 
(APC'') S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p. 
[From (AP1''), (AP2'')] 
As Pritchard notes, this argument is valid, and the second premise is 
exceedingly hard to deny. Moreover, as he further notes, on his own view it is 
possible to see that p without knowing that p. And the core thesis says that in 
paradigmatic cases, when an agent sees that p, the fact that she sees that p is 
reflectively available to her. So this is what leads to the impression that Pritchard 
must accept the first premise. 
But Pritchard claims that the first premise is false. This, he claims, is 
because the only cases in which it is possible to see that p without already 
knowing that p are cases in which one has misleading evidence – for example, that 
one justifiedly believes that one is in fake barn country even though one is not. 
But in these cases, he claims, obviously you cannot know by reflection alone that 
one sees that p – for example, that there is a barn in front of you. So, he claims, the 
very cases in which the access problem could possibly pose a threat are cases in 
which misleading evidence makes the first premise false. Hence, he concludes, the 
only cases in which an agent has a reflective justification available for an empirical 
proposition p are ones in which she knows that p on independent empirical 
grounds. So the fact that there is a reflective justification available in these cases 
does not, he holds, undermine the truism that such truths can only be known 
empirically. 
4. The Clash 
In order to maintain his answer to the access problem, Pritchard must claim that 
the only counterexamples to the principle that seeing entails knowing are cases in 
which the subject is in possession of misleading evidence – that is, that they are all 
cases in which the subject sees but is not even in a position to know. But as we 
saw earlier, the conceptual point that lies behind the basing problem presupposes 
that there are other cases in which one sees without knowing. And that is because, 
according to the conceptual point, nothing can be the original basis for one’s belief 
unless one had it before one formed the belief. So in particular, that one sees that 
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p cannot be the basis for one’s belief that p unless one sees that p before one 
knows that p. But in all such cases of successfully basing belief on what one sees, 
there is a time period during which one sees that p and is in a position to know 
that p, but does not yet know that p. And during this time, both premises of the 
argument formulating the access problem are true.  
As I’ve argued, in the absence of the conceptual point about priority in 
basing, it is very hard to see why the claim that seeing entails knowing would pose 
even a prima facie problem for Pritchard’s core thesis. So in principle, Pritchard 
could reject the conceptual point and take it as a point in his favor that it turns out 
that the basing problem is not, after all, even a prima facie problem for his view. 
But I think this would be a mistake. The claim that original basing requires 
temporal priority is central to any plausible understanding of what basing is or 
why it is epistemologically significant. Without this conceptual point, I worry that 
we would lose enough grip on what makes basing important to make it very 
unclear why Pritchard’s core thesis has anything enlightening to say about 
perceptual knowledge or about skepticism. So I conclude, instead, that Pritchard is 
on the right track to solving the basing problem, but on the wrong track to solving 
the access problem. And this should be no surprise; plausibly the access problem is 
the most central reason why the view that Pritchard describes in his book has 
been widely perceived as occupying an “unavailable” portion of logical space.8
                                                                
8 Special thanks to Conor McHugh, Clayton Littlejohn, Hagit Benbaji, and Ram Neta. 
